FPRI Wire

America’s Military Problems and How to Fix Them

Volume 9, Number 3
February 2001

By John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman

This essay is drawn from the forthcoming book America The Vulnerable: America’s Military Problems And How To Fix Them (FPRI, June 2001). The book is a product of four years of work by FPRI’s Defense Task Force, chaired by John F. Lehman, FPRI Trustee and former Secretary of the Navy, and Harvey Sicherman, President of FPRI.

A decade has passed since the end of the Cold War. The demise of the Soviet Union concluded the most vulnerable period in American history, a time when the possibility of nuclear attack threatened the very existence of the United States. No wonder then that Americans heaved a mighty sigh of relief, having survived to watch the fall of their country’s most powerful enemy.

Our new sense of security led to a predictable course of action. We disarmed. Starting with the first Bush administration and accelerating through both Clinton terms, the United States reduced its military forces by 40 percent. National defense expenditures in real terms (adjusted for inflation) dropped from $302.3 billion in 1992 to $274.8 billion in 2000. The portion of the U.S. gross national product devoted to defense shrank from 6.5 percent in 1985 to just over 3.0 percent, a level not seen since the 1930s. Arguably this defense “dividend” made a major contribution toward ending federal deficits.

Our military, however, was not allowed to rest on its laurels. U.S. forces were engaged abroad with increasing frequency in countries such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, culminating in the U.S.-led war with Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999. These operations strained falling budgets and smaller forces. Simultaneously, our defense planning was challenged by the so-called revolution in military affairs, which requires keeping U.S. defenses in the forefront of new technologies.

Slowly— very slowly— America’s complacency about security has begun to wear off, replaced by growing unease at what the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, called “the fraying of the force.” Among the greatest concerns:

Problems posed by an all-volunteer force to the American tradition of a citizens' army under civilian control.
The loss of qualified pilots, sailors, and soldiers in vital jobs throughout the services, and the unreadiness of various units.
The debatable wisdom of humanitarian interventions and their legacy of open-ended commitments.
An overly consolidated contractor base with hugely inflationary potential.
New missile threats and the controversy over missile defenses.
The dangers of biological and chemical weapons.
The challenge of ensuring computer security in an era of ubiquitous electronic communication and international hackers.

Each of these issues has its own community of partisans who will propose various actions to address them, and pressures on Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, and the White House may produce some progress. In our view, however, this piecemeal approach will obscure a larger issue. While none of these problems is yet at a crisis stage, together they are steadily eroding the U.S. capability to deter war across the spectrum or, should deterrence fail, to win any conflict.

Clearly, U.S. forces that are uncertain of their command and control, subject to operational disruption from computer hackers, and trained more for peacekeeping than warfighting are going to lack the capabilities America needs and expects. A noncompetitive industrial base will be unable to produce weapons in either the numbers or quality needed, but its wares will be outrageously expensive. And if the United States remains vulnerable to biological or chemical threats, or to ballistic missiles, then our government’s freedom of action abroad and our safety at home will be equally illusory.

But it is not too late to head off such a fate. We have the opportunity to correct the course, to steer clear of the “Pearl Harbor” cycle whereby only a disaster brings effective action. Doing so will require more resources, but the remarkably improved state of federal finances should ease the way for increased defense spending. We do not ask for a blank check. As the late economist Herbert Stein used to say, we may not have enough to do everything, but we do have enough to do what is necessary.

We also have the advantage of a relatively stable strategic consensus. The United States remains an Asian and European power and, if anything, the end of the Cold War has reinforced America’s role as the linchpin of security in those regions. The American people give no sign of wishing to relinquish these responsibilities which, in turn, set certain requirements for our force levels.

The notion of intelligent action by government in advance of a crisis may be regarded by some as an oxymoron, but there is no substitute for acting now to forestall a crisis in our military capabilities. Unlike earlier times, we are not burdened by either a lack of resources or strategic confusion. Only a fatal complacency will explain the absence of prudent measures.

To overcome such complacency, our leaders must be willing to educate the public in order to mobilize support. Defense, after all, is the first and most essential of public goods. We are convinced that a defense plan that concentrates on the main threats is the only effective way to proceed. We are also convinced that the American people will support it.

We turn now to the five most serious military problems and what can be done about them.

The Demilitarization of the Military

At the heart of our strategy is the axiom that to keep the peace we must be able to fight and win a war. Our military has as its principal mission the defense of the United States and our interests abroad. Throughout the Cold War, this required the training and deployment of large U.S. forces to other countries. They were held in readiness to fight a war, and from Korea to Vietnam to the Persian Gulf, they occasionally did so.

Surprisingly, despite the demise of our major adversary, U.S. military forces have been deployed overseas at a frenetic pace higher than any in history: thirty-seven separate deployments between 1991 and 1999, or an average of one deployment every eleven weeks. Of these, only eleven (29.7 percent) used military force to deter war or to conduct “traditional” war-fighting missions. The big missions of the past decade have pitched U.S. forces into the murky realms of so-called humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and the still murkier territory of “peace enforcement.”

This shift in focus could lead to what may be called a “demilitarization” of the military: the emphasis is no longer primarily on war but on contingencies fundamentally different from war. While U.S. forces have always been used to rescue civilians from natural disasters (and the Marine Corps in particular has a tradition of so-called small wars of intervention), these have always been a secondary, or lesser, mission. The wide use of American forces to rescue foreign populations from the ravages of bad government or civil war is new and troubling. Among the consequences:

Loss of focus. Concentrating on lower-order problems may come at the cost of innovation in war-fighting tactics, equipment, and organization. Given the great technological changes inherent in the revolution in military affairs, that cost appears prohibitive indeed.
Misdirection of talent. The best officers are always attracted to the “action,” and if the action is peacekeeping, we could find ourselves with an officer corps experienced primarily with constabulary and politico-military assignments rather than with warfare.
Disruption of training. Combat arms units involved in peacekeeping may need up to six months of retraining in order to recover their war-fighting skills.
Distortion of force strength. The army in particular justifies some of its end-strength based on the demands of peacekeeping.

These are the ways to “remilitarize” the military:

Sharpen intervention criteria. While we do not support a blanket rejection of humanitarian intervention, American forces must be committed in a sensible and prudent manner. Units with logistical, transportation, and command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities should be the first tapped for peacekeeping operations that require U.S. forces. Troops on the ground should be an absolute last resort.
Maintain the war-fighting edge. Training to fight wars must be the focus for most units, while a smaller portion of the force will require training for peacekeeping operations.
Integrate intelligence activities. The United States must better integrate its political and military intelligence activities for the forces engaged in peacekeeping operations.
Emphasize proportionality. Commanders, both civilian and military, must develop a better sense of proportion for the engagement of units supporting such operations. Disproportionality leads to the overuse of certain units and occupational specialties.

The Procurement Dilemma

There are two problems with procurement. One concerns the “sizing” issue, that is, the forces we need to achieve our objectives in the face of whatever threats may arise. The second concerns the industrial base, or how we procure the weapons those forces need.

As stated earlier, American forces have been functioning at a high operational tempo since the end of the Gulf War. During the same period, the number of personnel has shrunk by over 40 percent. Operations and maintenance have been sustained by underfunding training readiness and especially modernization, that is, the replacement and upgrading of materiel. As defense industries have consolidated in response to the drastically smaller market, the competitive spur of multiple procurement sources has disappeared for most systems. The smaller industrial capability of single suppliers cannot provide equipment at a cost that fits a reasonable defense budget.

For example, plans for procurement of the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighters by the air force, navy, and Marine Corps promise to be the largest defense industry contracts in American history— a total of more than $200 billion dollars. Such an enormous outlay of resources for two weapons systems basically guarantees that funding other forms of defense modernization will be difficult in the absence of a huge increase in the defense budget.

In response to these issues, we recommend five steps:

Redefine the sizing issue. The standard for U.S. forces to be able to fight two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts (e.g., in the Persian Gulf and Korea) should be updated. Current forces are "sized" according to the Desert Storm model, a scenario that is highly unlikely to recur. Instead, U.S. military planners should focus on force capabilities that can be used in any theater against multiple threats across the spectrum of conflict.
Eliminate nondefense missions. The Department of Defense should not be tasked with nondefense matters such as environmental clean-up. These activities, costing $5-8 billion annually, should be shifted to other federal agencies.
Promote competition in the defense industry. Costs of defense contracts must be controlled through competition. As procurement levels increase, additional firms will be able to compete. As for defense spending levels, the United States can afford to spend more, but without reform, any increased spending will only represent increased waste.
Streamline procurement. The Pentagon’s procurement process, which currently takes more than twenty years from the start of a new system to deployment (the F-22 being a good example), must be radically streamlined. Computing technology in the private sector (according to what is known as Moore’s Law) now grows obsolete in less than fourteen months.
Avoid the “silver bullet” trap. Do not assume that some technological revolution can resolve the structure-procurement- readiness dilemma. Advanced technology can bring greater efficiency, but not to the extent expected. For example, precision-guided munitions offer a distinct advantage over “dumb” bombs, but are not so accurate that they can substitute on a larger scale for other munitions. However, evidence does suggest that in the future, smaller, high-tech forces with greater speed and firepower will be most efficient.

The Military-Civilian Cultural Gap

The military and American society interact at two levels: (1) civil-military relations between the civilian political leadership and the uniformed military leadership; and (2) what is typically understood as a culture clash between the military and society at large.

Civil-military relations carry the heavy legacy of Vietnam, where, in the military’s view, civilians micromanaged the conflict and failed to support the forces in an unpopular war. This gave birth to numerous attempts to codify when and how U.S. forces should be used abroad, a movement that dovetailed with incessant efforts to centralize the command structure, effectively presenting a unified military position to the civilian leaders. An essential part of this shift was the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols). This legislation centralized military authority among the regional commanders in chief (CINCs) and made the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the sole principal military adviser to both the president and the secretary of defense. In practice, this limited not only the scope of military advice available to the political leadership, but also the policy- and priority-setting roles of the service chiefs and civilian service secretaries. The legislation also altered personnel policies so that staff experience, particularly on joint staffs, is now mandatory for promotion to the “flag” rank of admiral or general. Consequently, junior officers may infer that staff assignments matter more than command experience.

The problem of the gap between military culture and American society has become more noticeable in the era of the all-volunteer force, now a quarter-century old. Military culture is a crucial if often misunderstood aspect of defense. There will always be a divergence between the discipline required of a fighting force and the free-wheeling, individualism of the society it is charged to defend. In fact, an effective military has its own distinctive culture, one that emphasizes honor, courage, and self-sacrifice under a command structure. Attempts to erase this divide by "civilianizing" the military, or by making the services the focus of social experiments, risk serious harm to efficiency and morale. Disruptive social innovations, such as allowing women in combat or tolerating openly homosexual personnel, must be evaluated primarily by their effect on readiness, morale, and training.

The cultural issue has been further aggravated by the fact that fewer and fewer American leaders today have any military experience. The all-volunteer force and the absence of military recruiting on many college campuses reinforces the gap in understanding between those who serve and those they defend. In a democracy, it is vital that defense should not become the narrow preserve of a few who remain separate from the rest of society.

Several steps will help address these problems:

Change the law. Title X of the U.S. Code should be amended to increase and diversify the sources of advice available to the president, strengthen civilian control, and emphasize command and leadership rather than bureaucratic skills.
Promote short-term service. The military should target a broader socioeconomic spectrum when recruiting both officers and enlisted personnel. To that end, it should offer shorter commitments to active-duty service and increase opportunities for service members to continue their commitments in the federal reserves or National Guard.
Expand military education and familiarization programs. Establishing military familiarization programs would enable the civilian leadership to understand the military experience and the conduct of warfare. Additionally, more courses on civil-military relations should be introduced to universities, and ROTC programs promoted wherever feasible.
Manage the gap. We must understand that there will always be a gap between the culture(s) of the military and that of civilian society, and recognize that the preferences of would-be social reformers may have negative effects on the professionalism of the military institution. At the same time, it is essential to institute personnel policies that promote those who are best qualified regardless of their race, color, gender, or creed, and that prohibit double standards for the physical, mental, and skills requirements for men and women.

The Threats Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction

The fourth threat to American national security is the vulnerability of U.S. forces and the civilian populace to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Paradoxically, the convincing performance of the American military in Operation Desert Storm has convinced many potential adversaries that the only way to offset America’s conventional military dominance is to acquire weapons that can target the American home front. Despite international efforts to curtail them, many nations have acquired or sought such weapons, particularly nuclear, since the end of the Cold War. Both India and Pakistan publicly joined the nuclear club by testing weapons in 1998. North Korea, Iran, and Iraq are also known to be seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to deliver them. The United States must also consider the growing military might of China, including a major expansion of its missile forces. Russian military doctrine also continues to stress the importance of nuclear weapons.

The United States, however, still has no means to defend itself against such dangers except by threatening aggressors with nuclear retaliation, a step fraught with its own moral dilemma, especially when dealing with dictators who have effectively made hostages of their own populations. A broad consensus has developed in the United States that a limited ballistic nuclear defense is a prudent step. Some have argued that the development of such a system may lead the Russians and others to increase their missile arsenals in the interest of sustaining a nuclear balance, that is, to deny the United States the ability to strike them while shielding itself from a counterstrike. But no one has seriously argued for a system of total protection for the mainland United States that will be capable of dealing with all types of missile attack; some missiles will always get through. Rather, a limited system (the only sort that is technically feasible) could offer an additional measure of protection against some threats without upsetting the security of Russia, China, or other major powers-unless, of course, their intentions are hostile.

Biological and chemicals weapons are seen as the “poor man’s” nuclear weapons, and many states and would-be terrorists are trying to develop them. Despite sensational media coverage, these weapons have proven very difficult to control and have never been decisive on the battlefield. They remain, however, a potentially devastating way to terrorize a society, a danger well illustrated by the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s attack on the Tokyo subways in 1995. Fortunately, the United States already has in place the elements for an effective civil defense against such weapons.

To reduce U.S. vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), an effective program would do the following:

Develop limited national missile defense. The technical parameters of a limited land-based missile defense should be established and our allies persuaded that it would also help to protect them. To that end, a constructive discussion must be held with Russia regarding the revision of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, although this should not be allowed to determine our decision about deployment. Also, we should experiment with a theater missile defense based on the Navy’s Aegis system that may be well suited to regional defenses.
Improve existing systems to defend against biological and chemical threats. These threats, while serious, do not justify vast new expenditures. Most cities and towns have emergency procedures already available (e.g., for controlling chemical and toxic spills) that can be developed to another level. Existing defense systems in cities such as New York need to be studied and duplicated if possible. National Guard capabilities on this front should also be improved and expanded. Local emergency personnel will be the most available and able to respond should such an attack take place.
Improve intelligence capabilities in regard to WMD. In light of the fact that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests came as a surprise (as did the last North Korean rocket test), the United States must improve its intelligence capabilities concerning WMD. Specifically, we need people on the ground to supplement other methods of obtaining information.

The Cyberthreat

The United States has moved from an industrial to an information economy. Computers, faxes, and electronic mail are indispensable throughout all segments of our society and constitute the “central nervous system” of the U.S. military. Weapons systems are increasingly sophisticated and rely on the same technologies that have made the civilian sector boom throughout the latter half of the 1990s. Unfortunately, such systems can be attacked and disabled with potentially catastrophic consequences.

The National Security Agency has admitted that several crucial spy satellites were disabled due to year 2000 computer glitches, and the Pentagon computer system has been attacked numerous times by hackers, some of whom may have been working for foreign governments. During the air war over Kosovo, for instance, a senior military officer warned that we had withstood our first information warfare attack when someone, presumably Serbs, bombarded e-mail systems within the European Command.

Much like chemical or biological weapons, information warfare is particularly useful to weaker states as they seek to attain tactical advantages over the United States. Information warfare has been called a "weapon of mass disruption" because of its ability to disable systems of both civil and military importance. Until now, the technological revolution spurred on by the development of the computer has mostly aided the offense, but if military history has anything to teach, a defensive reaction will be forthcoming. America cannot afford to lag behind in either case.

We propose three actions for dealing with this threat:

Improve dialogue between the public and private sector. The government and its agencies can learn much about information warfare and its capabilities from the private sector. Such a dialogue could prove advantageous to both sides for defending the nation’s information infrastructure.
Explore diplomatic options. International agreements on the unrestricted global flow of information should be developed and strengthened, and should include safeguards against abuse.
Develop information-warfare capabilities in the reserves. The National Guard and federal reserves offer the best way for the federal government to tap into civilian expertise in information warfare. Guardsmen and reservists have access to information technologies not found in most parts of the U.S. government. The formation of reserve units specializing in information warfare would be cost effective, play to reservists' core competencies, and improve our defenses against such attacks.

A Note on Money

This report would be remiss without a comment on the costs of the program outlined above. The defense budget is a rather esoteric subspecialty of political economy, and the only thing that can be said definitively about it is that the numbers never stay still. According to the latest estimates from the Congressional Budget Office, a “sustaining budget” of $340 billion (about 15 percent higher than in 1999) will be necessary to support current and projected forces. This reflects the bulge in procurement to replace aging weapons systems that were neglected because of operations and readiness spending over the past decade. Others have suggested smaller increases of anywhere from 2 to 10 percent.

Our view is that when we evaluate the next defense budget, we should be sure to ask the right questions: Does it reduce the vulnerabilities we have described? Does it reverse, or at least halt, the erosion in our military capabilities? Is it coupled with sufficient reforms in the Pentagon so that the money is wisely spent, or is it merely throwing more money at the wrong problems in the same old way? Our security and the security of our children depend on the right answers.

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