Watch on the West
A Newsletter of FPRI’s Center for the Study of America and the West

A Preliminary Reckoning: Prospects for U.S.-European Relations After Iraq

Volume 4, Number 1
April 2003

by William Anthony Hay

William Anthony Hay is Research Fellow and Executive Director of FPRI’s Center for the Study of America and the West. His article on “The Geopolitics of Europe” appears in the Spring 2003 issue of Orbis, which has a special focus on Geography and Geopolitics.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted on March 25, 2003 that after the war with Iraq there will be “a reckoning about the relations between America and Europe.” He took upon himself to discuss with President George W. Bush how to “get America and Europe working together as partners and not as rivals.” But can this be done given the bitterness generated on both sides of the dispute over the war with Iraq? Transatlantic institutions have weathered past disagreements, and the history of earlier crises over missile deployment or other issues often have a contemporary ring. Is the current situation any different? What relationships have ended and what can be mended?

American Foreign Policy Under the Bush Administration

U.S. foreign policy itself provides a good starting point. Contrary to general criticism, the Bush administration’s policy toward the European allies remains more complex than the stark choice between unilateralism and multilateralism. President Bush made two trips in Europe during 2001 and 2002 that featured major policy speeches emphasizing the role of the European Union and NATO and promoting a broader agenda of consolidating democratic stability, and his European counterparts responded positively to these overtures. American policy sought the integration of Eastern and Central Europe into the West, while improving relations with Russia and supporting efforts to promote stability along the former Soviet periphery. Media coverage of protests and differences on such matters as environmental policy and the death penalty drew more attention than these plans, but gave a misleading picture of transatlantic relations.

The September 11 attacks demonstrated the threat from terrorism and provided the United States with an agenda to structure a foreign policy that previously had been developed on a regional basis. Even before the attacks, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice warned of asymmetrical threats and argued for a new concept of deterrence to handle them. NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson spoke of the “disaggregation of the security threat,” a phrase that aptly stated the problem facing the United States and Europe since the end of the Cold War. The war on terrorism highlighted the need to extend stability along the periphery of Europe, cooperate on investigative and policing efforts, and to rework NATO as a political organization that would provide a starting point for coalitions of the willing. Despite some predictable criticism from the anti-American wing of the European left, the Bush administration won general support from European allies and NATO through the U.S. led Afghan campaign of 2001-2. Washington’s desire to find common ground with its European allies and Russia in the war on terrorism stepped up the pace along a road charted before September 11.

Problems Emerging

Against this background of cooperation, the Iraq issue laid bare not only strong disagreements on how to handle Saddam but also deeper fissures below the surface of public discussion. Few expected the political agenda to shift focus from the particulars of handling Iraq to a discussion of America’s role in the world and France’s role within Europe. Several episodes marked the transition for narrow to broad disagreement.

Gerhard Schroeder used strident anti-American rhetoric and opposition to war with Iraq in eking out a narrow victory in the Fall 2002 German elections. Schroeder appealed to an old strain of pacifist and anti-American sentiment among the SDP-Green coalition’s electoral base, but he also made a few early attacks on the EU as a burden on German taxpayers which indicated that his concern lay in shifting attention from a faltering domestic economy rather than changing policy on Germany’s relationship with the U.S. His election rhetoric, however, first articulated European opposition to military action against Iraq and publicly staked out a position from which it would be difficult to retreat.
French President Jacques Chirac elevated his disagreement with U.S. policy on Iraq to a broader quarrel over America’s role in world politics. Chirac viewed Iraq as a once and possibly future client for arms sales and influence, buttressed by his personal relationship with Saddam dating to the 1970s. Chirac also wished to avoid disturbances among French Muslims, a group the French government has begun to watch far more closely since last year. Differences with Washington over Iraq might have been resolved pragmatically, but the French leaders elevated the Iraqi disagreement into an extended conflict over the United States’ global role. Chirac remarked in a February 27 interview with Time that “any community with only one dominant power is always a danger and provokes reactions.” French-led opposition to American policy on Iraq struck a common chord among many Europeans, but it remains to be seen how many really subscribe to French views that “dominant powers” pose a threat by definition. Subsequent disagreements between European governments suggest that few will actually follow France’s lead beyond the very short term.
Articulation of American foreign policy goals shifted in a way that mixed signals. Now stressing anti-terrorism, then arms control through the United Nations, rhetoric from Washington at other times touted a democratic revolution throughout the Middle East. Most notoriously, what critics called the doctrine of “preemption” confused the situation further. The Bush administration never conceived of this as a blank check for American assaults on regimes that had angered Washington. It merely elaborated on a simple observation that in the war on terrorism-as in all wars-the United States need not wait for attacks by terrorists and states that shelter them before acting to counter the threat. While preemption appears to have been dropped from presidential rhetoric because of misunderstandings, it remains a potent source of criticism.
Failure to articulate the common threat posed by Saddam’s regime or link Iraq with the war on terrorism made negotiating with European allies more trouble for Washington than building an inner coalition among Arab states bordering Iraq. Arguments structured around the NATO formula of shared risks and shared burdens failed to resonate in much of Europe, and bungled diplomacy surrounding military arrangements with Turkey damaged the alliance. These failures in mobilizing an “outer coalition” contrasted sharply with Saddam’s smaller Gulf neighbors. This inner coalition, with whom Saudi Arabia also cooperated, feared instability brought by a drawn-out or indecisive campaign that would leave them exposed as at the end of the 1991 war. They did not oppose regime change itself in Iraq.

Each of these factors created problems in building an effective coalition against Saddam, but taken together they created the diplomatic equivalent of a“perfect storm” with consequences beyond the immediate question of Iraq.

Consequences of the Dispute

Given the bitterness engendered on both sides by recent diplomatic conflict, French efforts to build an anti- American coalition, and the final Anglo-American decision to act without the UN Security Council’s endorsement, one might expect a deep fissure broadly affecting relations within the Atlantic alliance. But nothing along those lines has yet taken place. The United States and Britain have not gone beyond rhetoric in exacting retribution for what they perceived as a betrayal by France, Germany, and Belgium. France took no practical steps to impede the coalition military effort, and Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin replied to a question about permitting the coalition to use French airspace that it was a “custom” in alliances. Germany aided logistical efforts in support of the Iraq war and provided troops to relieve American forces guarding bases for other duties elsewhere. Despite the harsh words, governments and the foreign policy establishments on both sides have sought to confine the dispute and prevent it from interfering with cooperation on other issues. A complete break serves nobody’s interests and remains highly unlikely.

Villepin faces the difficult task of trying to build a French-led European coalition that opposes American power while avoiding a transatlantic break. French public opinion shares government opposition to the war, but politicians experienced in foreign policy and close to Chirac such as Pierre Lellouche and Alain Madelin have questioned his prudence in sparking a confrontation with Washington that stokes emotional anti-Americanism. The immediate question is whether France will try to organize a blocking coalition in the UN as humanitarian relief and reconstruction issues come to the fore. In early April, the French signaled a desire to mend fences. Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin publicly warned the National Assembly against“displays of anti-Americanism,” and French officials have been told not to criticize American conduct of the war. Chirac personally apologized to Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II for the desecration of British war graves with pro-Saddam propaganda and emphasized long-standing Anglo-French ties. Nonetheless, Villepin’s London speech on March 27 announcing the effort to improve relations with Washington indicates that Paris has some way to go in relearning the vocabulary of cooperation. The substance behind his remarks indicated an overture to mend fences with Britain after Blair organized European opposition to French efforts more than anything else.

Franco-American tensions, however, should not obscure the more important developments within NATO. Much friction would have been avoided if the question of Turkish reinforcement had not been raised in the North Atlantic Council but referred instead from the outset to the Military Committee, where the motion finally succeeded. (France has been absent from the committee since DeGaulle withdrew the country from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966.) This is an old tactic that has worked well, and it seems remarkable that it was not used to secure aid for Turkey with minimal conflict. A workable NATO consensus on divisive issues still can be organized as it has been in the past, and recent problems may indicate mismanagement by Washington rather than structural flaws within the alliance.

The larger question is whether or not the alliance is still relevant. In theory, as the world’s most effective permanent coalition, NATO remains uniquely capable of coordinating military action. Such an integrated military alliance pools the capabilities of its member states for mutual benefit, including specialties from minesweeping to special forces and aerial reconnaissance, where American forces welcome the support. European bases remain a vital asset for many American operations beyond NATO’s area of immediate responsibility, and logistics provide another integrated function not easily duplicated. NATO’s clumsy record in the Balkans and American reluctance to use the alliance at all in Afghanistan suggest, however, that theoretical capabilities do not easily translate into action beyond the alliance’s treaty area. Moreover, that area of responsibility is expanding as countries in Central and Eastern Europe join the alliance. NATO remains primarily a backstop to European security. The old Cold War-era formula of the alliance as a starting point for building coalitions to act out of area works more effectively than formal NATO endorsement of actions that some members may oppose.

What about the European Union, the exclusively European pillar of the alliance? Although some commentators have called for the EU to provide a counterweight to the United States-in essence supporting the view that Chirac expressed to Time-their agenda lacks broader European support. France and Germany convened a meeting for April 29 to discuss closer military cooperation with Belgium and Luxembourg, pointedly excluding other European countries that sided with Washington on Iraq. Moreover, the EU Common Security and Foreign Policy was languishing even before the crisis over Iraq, and a strong case might now be made that it cannot work well beyond those areas, such as the Palestinian issue, where checkbook diplomacy still matters. Investment in military capabilities at the national level and agreement on their use is the precondition for more far-reaching EU initiatives. Beyond their unwillingness to spend the money, European countries themselves show little desire to risk key security relationships with the United States for the uncertain prospects of an independent EU force.

Moreover, the dispute brought out tensions within Europe equal to those between the United States and France. The split with the EU and its candidate members highlights the existence of an inner and outer Europe with different geopolitical perspectives that had fallen from view as observers continually presented Europe as an isotropic surface progressing toward greater integration. Political and structural economic conflicts remain, even within the inner Europe defined by the relationship between France and Germany. National governments adopt positions on the basis of perceived interests, and they will not cede authority to the EU executive where it does not promote those national interests or the government’s own electoral position. Even where interests are not at stake or governments lack the power to act, foreign policy initiatives serve domestic political purposes that should not be overlooked. A European policy that collides with national differences cannot be sustained despite the enthusiasm of leading groups within the political class. Countervailing pressures, both cultural and economic, show that talk of “finality” and Europe’s transition from “nation states” to “member states” reflects the earnest desires of certain interest groups more than political reality. Efforts to move beyond the EU’s core economic mission or press an agenda at odds with national policies thus face major impediments that make success unlikely. The Iraq crisis has driven this point home again.

Assessments

A preliminary reckoning of U.S.-European relations yields several conclusions. Neither the U.S. nor its European allies want to broaden the conflict over Iraq to the point where it impairs the basic relationship. Few European governments, as opposed to the media and advocacy groups, will take the French view of American power, and fewer still (including Paris) will choose to break security ties. NATO remains available for properly conceived missions, especially those that rely on the old formula of building coalitions before resorting to various international organizations that work best by ratifying a consensus developed privately. Despite ambitions for a larger political role, the EU continues for the most part to be an economic enterprise, and the “European Constitution” being drafted by a committee chaired by former French leader Valery Giscard d’Estaing has been overtaken by the events discussed above. Relations can indeed be mended, and both sides appear to be feeling their way toward doing so. The course of the war and reconstruction afterward will test the sincerity and effectiveness of those efforts.

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