Watch on the West
A Newsletter of FPRI’s Center for the Study of America and the West

European Unification and Transatlantic Relations: A View from Germany

Report of a Lecture by Holger Mey

Volume 4, Number 3
June 2003

This document is a report of a talk on April 11, 2003 by Holger Mey, President and CEO of the Institute for Strategic Analyses in Bonn, Germany (www.isa-ev.de). The talk was sponsored by the Warburg Chapter of the American Council on Germany and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The rapporteur was William Anthony Hay.

How have relations between Germany and the United States reached their current state? America strongly supported German unification when Britain and France each sought to block it. Europeans, Mey joked, loved Germany so much that they wanted two of them.

During the First Gulf war in 1991, Germany provided $8-9 billion dollars in financial assistance without any voice on policy. This was a lesson that led German leaders to realize that participation was the precondition for influence over policy. Support by the Red-Green coalition for the war in Kosovo in spring 1999 marked the first instance where Germany committed troops beyond its borders. The deployment brought a sense that Germany had become a “normal” country that could participate in the international system as a full partner. The subordinate role of subsidizing actions by allies without a voice had ended. After September 11, Gerhard Schroeder pledged unconditional support to the United States in the war on terrorism. German forces served in Afghanistan in challenging combat missions and as peacekeepers, and Germany hosted diplomatic efforts to bring Afghan factions together.

Iraq changed the situation. The German Chancellor believed that having participated in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Germany now had the flexibility to choose not to participate in other campaigns as any country might. Accusations of neutrality, pacifism, or being unreliable allies would not stick if Germany held apart on Iraq when they had joined in other efforts.

While that analysis might have seemed reasonable if argued well and supported by substantial offers to aid the United States elsewhere, Schroeder declared his opposition on Iraq before the question was asked. The Bush administration had discreetly informed the German government that it would not make controversial requests on Iraq until after the 2002 elections to avoid placing it in an awkward position. Schroeder, in turn, promised not to attack the American position on Iraq during the election. This explains why Schroeder election rhetoric particularly antagonized the Bush administration. Schroeder presented himself as a man of peace in a fervently populist appeal that along with other promises related to flood relief eked out a narrow victory. Diplomacy was far from the politician's mind and he doubtless expected to mend relations afterward. Having joined in several military efforts, Germany retained a right to hold back from others.

Two developments impeded a German-American rapprochement. Schroeder’s campaign emboldened anti-American elements on the German left who dealt in strident rhetoric that officials or experienced politicians would have avoided. Germany also became drawn into French diplomatic maneuvers during the autumn of 2002.

Here it becomes important to note the historical experiences that motivate German interest in connections with the West. As a fragmented collection of principalities, kingdoms, and city states, Germany was more a geographical expression than a country and thus divided remained vulnerable to its neighbors. The Kaiserreich formed by German unification in the nineteenth century went to the opposite extreme. Germany became too big to be part of the balance of power while remaining too small to be a hegemon in Europe. The disaster of the Nazi era confirmed this lesson: Germany’s attempt to become a hegemon led to the destruction of the European continent. Integration into the West was an alternative to these historic problems. European integration offered one option centered on Franco-German relations. An Atlanticist policy, however, brought Germany into a broader West. Germany sought to balance between these two options, telling both Paris and Washington that each of them is Germany’s primary ally. As a consequence, Germany finds itself pulled into rivalry between France and the United States.

The United States is a European country outside Europe. While no European country can lead in way that its neighbors will accept, Europeans can follow American leadership. Germany, in particular, can find greater freedom in an American-led system where it does not scare its neighbors. Helmut Kohl saw German Unification as part of European Unification, and his concept of a United Europe where national governments pooled sovereignty and devolved power to regions drew on German assumptions. Kohl's view changed and he acknowledged during a speech in Bonn that he had underestimated national feeling in other European countries. Mey believed that Kohl had been excessively Francophile and this deference to Paris had injured German interests. While France should choose its own policy and has good reasons for doing so, Mey insisted that Germany also has good reasons to set its own priorities rather than reflexively follow those of France.

The European Union has not fulfilled the ambitions Kohl and others had for it. Currency Union without political union gives Europe a single currency policy with many different economic policies. Tensions here are obvious. The EU provides a common economic infrastructure, but no security role. Defense and security policy remain national functions. NATO thus continues to play a vital role in European security.

NATO was once described as existing to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. That agenda can be updated as follows: keeping the U.S. engaged in European security affairs; making sure that Europe is a strong partner to Russia and not a weak one; and keeping Germany an integral part of the West, thus preventing neighbors and partners of Germany from building coalitions to counterbalance German power.

Collective security requires a self-interest. The end of the Soviet Union removed the shared threat that held NATO together as a military alliance, and transformed it into a basis for ad hoc coalitions. Accepting new members helped the transition in the former Soviet Bloc by bringing countries closer to the West. But if everybody is an ally of everybody, nobody is an ally of anybody. Bilateral relationships among NATO member states became more important in the post-Cold War era than the older concept of an integrated military alliance. NATO became the vehicle for building a security relationship with the United States and also a clearinghouse for mobilizing coalitions. These changes mean that NATO is more a political organization than the strong military alliance it was. The current splits within Europe regarding Iraq further fuels this “re-bilateralization” process as each country in Europe tries to define its own bilateral relationship with the United States.

The security environment has also changed in a manner with implications for collective security through what Mey called the “democratization of threat” in which everyone can threaten anyone else. American military supremacy-and the general advantages Western military forces over potential adversaries-makes a conventional challenge pointless. But how does one win a “non-conventional war”? States have an incentive to acquire weapons of mass destruction as a deterrent against Western intervention. They thus seek the same room for maneuver that the West used to enjoy. Post-Cold War international politics involve a competition for freedom to act that hearkens back to earlier periods. Western countries want the ability to intervene elsewhere in support of their interests and principles. Others want to block that intervention and maintain their own room to maneuver. The tensions between these perspectives can be seen in many specific cases.

Is there a difference between American and European approaches to handling the problem? Yes, but there should not be. Political solutions often exist and should be tried, but they are not always possible. Iraq offered a choice between deterrence and containment on the one hand and regime change on the other. Many in Germany and elsewhere in Europe thought that Saddam could be contained and deterred, but they offered little evidence to support that policy-to the contrary. While Mey generally favored containment and deterrence over war, he also criticized the position of other Germans whose position strained ties with the United States. The Iraq war started 12 years ago, and now it was time to finish it. Iraq had violated ceasefire agreements, and no additional justification was required for combating the Iraqi regime. There was also no need for further UN resolutions to authorize action.

Working to build support on Iraq through the United Nations, where France and Russia could organize a blocking coalition, placed the United States into a “no win” situation. The final outcome of pre-war negotiations only served the arguments of hawks in Washington who oppose working through the United Nations or with allies. While perfectly understandable, it would be unfortunate for such views to prevail because cooperation is necessary to contain threats, for instance, from piracy and terrorism.

The EU had nothing to offer in Iraq. If, however, European governments are so convinced of their diplomatic skills and their preference for diplomacy over war, they have a unique opportunity to ensure that Iran does not become a new security problem in the region. Mey emphasized the need for Europe and the United States to cooperate in extending stability. While success of American military efforts in Afghanistan can be seen in the fact that Sudan and Somalia no longer provide havens for terrorism, containing the “democratization of threat” represents a complex challenge that requires American leadership as well as cooperation by the West.

The United States has an important role leading regional security relationships where neighboring countries will not defer to one another or cooperate. For example, anti-Americanism in Japan or South Korea probably poses more of a threat than North Korea. Any perceived erosion of American security guarantees might force those nations to reconsider their non-nuclear status, which in turn would destabilize East Asia. Europe provides a less extreme situation where American leadership makes regional cooperation operate more easily. Mey stressed the importance of German-American relations in this context. Germany and the United States have, in terms of political culture and interests, much in common, more than Germany has in common, for instance, with France. Both the United States and Germany are too big to be easily loved; Germany regionally and the United States globally. Whatever European critics may claim, the United States has been fighting wars for collective security. Europe has not done so and needs to join the effort. There is a vital need for U.S.-European cooperation in sustaining a Western world order because any alternative would be much worse.

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